| 20th August 2004 - Vodafone K.K., formerly J-Phone,
is Japan's third wireless operator, with less subscribers
than either NTT DoCoMo, or KDDI. Vodafone K.K. has been
struggling for some time to grow its share of the market
and to prove that its parent can successfully compete
in the most innovative wireless market on the globe. Last
week's news that Vodafone K.K. lost over 3,000 customers
(2% of its customer base) in July, the first time any
Japanese wireless operator has experienced negative growth,
does nothing to further that goal.
Vodafone K.K.'s loss last month illustrates one of
the quiet changes in global wireless services that are
taking place right now. The largest operators of the
US and Europe are reviewing their expansion strategies
and are focusing on their core markets. Expansions outside
of those markets are strategic, and based on business
plans that look for under-penetrated markets that are
ripe for growth. Vodafone's Japanese business plan fails
on both of these counts.
Vodafone K.K. is a 3G operator; offering WCDMA service
based on 3GPP as well as older 2G PDC-based technologies.
It was the first provider of picture mail service -
the groundbreaking Sha-Mail, in 2000. It has 15 million
subscribers, and by the end of this month will cover
99.6% of Japan's population with 3G. With all of this
going for it, what could be wrong?
What's wrong is that Vodafone is in an innovative,
but near-saturated market. Currently, more than 60%
of Japan's population has a mobile phone. If current
growth trends continue, that penetration level would
reach 94% by 2009. Even a more realistic penetration
level of somewhere in the mid-80% range (similar to
Northern European markets) would represent an attractive
growth market. However, as wireless industry veterans
know, growth after 50% (or 60%) penetration levels are
reached is infinitely more difficult to achieve than
pre-50% growth. The most valuable, higher MOU and higher
ARPU customers have already been signed up, future growth
comes from market segments that have been previously
neglected. In other markets those segments would include
youth, elderly, and immigrants, sectors with lower buying
power. The Japanese market is, however, different. Mobile
phones are ubiquitous among young people, immigration
is low, and many of the elderly that don't yet have
a mobile phone don't want one. Growth will have to come
from elsewhere.
Other growth opportunities can come from an operator's
existing customer base, as customers are encouraged
to pay for and use new services. Vodafone K.K.'s Sha-Mail
is a good example of this kind of service, where the
introduction of phones with embedded cameras in 2000,
drove people to take pictures and send them from their
phones to other phones. However, much of the technological
innovation in the Japanese wireless market comes from
NTT DoCoMo, the market leader, whose early i-mode service
first introduced Japanese customers to the idea of using
their phones to play games and send cartoons to each
other.
To succeed in the services-game, an operator's services
and technology must be at least as good as their competitors'.
However, Vodafone K.K.'s 3G network rollout has lagged
behind that of its rivals. As importantly, its new handset
rollout schedule has lagged too, and it currently has
no new handset introductions scheduled before December.
In Japan, where customers choose operators based on
handsets as much as service, and where customers often
upgrade their handsets more than once a year, the perception
is that Vodafone K.K. is simply not as innovative as
DoCoMo and KDDI.
The proof of this is easily seen in the number of 3G
subscribers each operator is able to attract. While
KDDI was the early leader in adding 3G customers, DoCoMo
has started closing the gap in recent months. KDDI has
14.7 million 3G customers (though that does include
slower 1xRTT subscribers) and added 219,700 new ones
in July; DoCoMo has 4.6 million WCDMA subscribers and
added 225,700 in July. Vodafone K.K. added only 19,400
3G customers, down 10,000 from the previous month -
and most of those were upgrades of its existing 2G customers;
overall lost 3,100 customers.
This brings up the question of why Vodafone thought
it should compete in the Japanese market. Vodafone K.K.
handsets and services are currently inferior to its
competitors', it is operating in a saturated market,
and for the first time for any Japanese wireless operator,
it is losing subscribers.
Meanwhile, large operators in the rest of the world
are focusing on their core markets. In the US, Cingular
is purchasing AT&T Wireless so that it can challenge
Verizon Wireless' dominance. Bell South has sold its
Latin American wireless operations so that it can better
focus on its role in Cingular (and to raise cash for
the AT&T Wireless puchase). Spain's Telefonica Mobiles
has frozen its 3G plans for Austria, Germany, Italy,
and Switzerland and is investing in low-penetration/high-growth
markets in Latin America. DoCoMo has also rolled back
its international expansion plans for i-mode in Europe
and the US to devote more time and money to its home
market. These operators are leading the way for all
operators, showing that foreign adventures in tough
markets are not the best way for an operator to grow
their business. They are focusing on core-markets where
they can leverage their core expertise, and on home
markets that they want to protect. Japan is neither
of these for Vodafone.
Vodafone is in a lose/lose position in Japan. It can't
pull out of the market without losing both face, and
a large cash investment, and it will never surpass DoCoMo
or KDDI. It needs to find a way to attract customers
and to be profitable in its third-tier position. To
do so in the Japanese market, it will have to offer
customers better service, more features, and a more
innovative handset line-up. However, to do this will
require continual investment, and Japan will never be
a substantially profitable market for the operator.
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